Aviation Week о российских ВВС
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Е. Мясников
http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus
Aviation Week & Space Technology
March 5, 2001
Russian Air Force Faces Deepening Crisis
By Craig Covault, Moscow
The situation in the dilapidated and demoralized Russian air force continues to worsen with hundreds upon hundreds of aircraft rusting into the ground, few changes
in Soviet-era doctrine or tactics and thousands of pilots receiving little or no flight time.
The Russian air force is in a downward spiral from which there is little hope of recovery without more massive cuts than contemplated in both aircraft and personnel,
according to about a dozen experts and close observers of that air force who met recently with Aviation Week & Space Technology.
These sources, from seven countries, spoke on background. All confirmed that the overall situation in the Russian air force is generally worse than acknowledged by
their military. Modernization remains a dream, but the changes need to be far more drastic than upgraded hardware.
THERE IS SCANT FUEL to maintain basic proficiency, let alone military capability, and the crisis is trending toward an even worse situation when most of the
experienced pilots will have retired or moved into staff jobs.
This will leave the air force with a minimal flight experience base and largely unserviceable aircraft.
Under these circumstances, there is serious question about whether the air force has become as much a liability as an asset to the former Soviet Union.
These assessments on the weakening of the Russian air force will have an impact on U.S. and West European military budgets and weapons system planning,
especially as part of the overall Pentagon review ordered by President George W. Bush.
Russian plans to cut 36,000 air force personnel in the next several years will still leave the air force too large and inefficient for the resources needed, according to
sources.
In aircraft, for example, the Russians have a force of about 2,000 at the present time, but only 46% or less are serviceable. "I would try and sell them off or dig a big
hole and just push them in, scrap them, because they are no good," one source said. "Many are little more than hulks."
In order for the force to remain viable under current conditions, it would need to be reduced to about 500 aircraft. But the experts interviewed had doubts about
President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense opting for such cuts because that would relegate the country to the status of a "regional power," like India, as
opposed to a global power--a position in which it still views itself.
However, Russia's strategic bomber force maintains a viable nuclear deterrent with a force of Tu-160 Blackjack, Tu-22 Backfire and Tu-95MS Bear-H cruise
missile bombers. About 100 strategic bombers are in service.
As recently as late February, all three aircraft types in the bomber force participated in a major exercise, supported by Il-78 Midas tankers, in connection with the
test launch of ballistic missiles fired from Russian submarines.
The situation is much worse in fighter and tactical regiments. There is a small cadre of proficient ground-attack fighter-bomber pilots, many with Chechnyan
experience (AW&ST Feb. 14, 2000, p. 76). But pure fighter pilot regiments have become largely impotent, according to sources.
Russian military aircraft export issues and a return to Soviet-style restrictiveness all are also factors in the air force situation. Those interviewed agreed that beyond
the aircraft, fuel and training problems there is increased subterfuge and a lack of truthfulness in statements from the Russian military.
THE PROBLEM IS ALSO GROWING in marketing claims made by the Russian military aircraft and weapons industry, sources agreed. There is an increased level
of "outright lying, especially by Russian officials at the MAKS Moscow air show," about aerospace system capabilities and Russian export sales and support, one
senior official said. "You have to expect some of this because it is Russia, but it is getting worse."
"This is going to increasingly affect their ability to sell aircraft. If they are not being honest with their customers, they will start to go away," another official said.
There are signs that bogus spare parts, fronted by financially desperate Russian component manufacturers, are also beginning to enter the parts support flow for
Russian aerospace exports.
"The Chinese were recently given some Russian spare parts that were not up to par, so there is corruption going on in the Russian spare parts business. Parts are
being sold with 'false passports' and the factories involved could lose their reputations," a source said.
Export sales of Su-27 variants, like those to India and China, are maintaining Sukhoi as a company and form a basis for modernization of the Russian air force
(AW&ST Feb. 5, p. 51). But the sources cautioned not to read too much into the broader impact on the air force from these sales.
Having weapons exports as a fundamental underpinning for operating an air force to carry out Russian national objectives raises serious policy questions.
"Now their only large clients are traditional clients like China and India, that do not have much [political leeway] to buy Western aircraft.
"And they do have a bit of an advertising problem," one source said. "They say 'buy our aircraft--even our own government won't touch them, but you've got to have
them.'"
Sukhoi may be relatively healthy, b